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DISTRIBUTION OF EXEMPT SECURITIES
UNDER SECTION 4(1) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
The purpose of this comment is to examine the problems which may
confront investment purchasers and "controlling persons" when they attempt
to resell securities taken under an exemption from federal registration.
Under section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, "transactions by any
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer; transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering

. . ."I are

considered exempt transactions, 2

and securities issued under this exemption are free of the extensive registration requirements of the act.3 Purchasers of securities issued pursuant to this
section may broadly be classified as investment purchasers. Because registration is costly and time-consuming, the prospect of coming under an
exemption from registration has an immediate appeal. By the ever vigilant
effort of the Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unlawful
"distribution"4 of securities without prior registration, restrictive limits have
been set on the use of this section.5 Further, the investment purchasers
of these exempt securities may find themselves severely curtailed when
they attempt to dispose of their holdings, if indeed they are legally able
to sell them at all.
. Investment purchasers, as used herein, are persons who have taken
stock under an exemption with the avowed purpose of holding it, and not
with a view toward distribution.e Controlling persons are those investment
purchasers whose holdings place them in a position in which they can
influence the direction of the company. Sometimes the intent of holding
the stock for investment purposes is evidenced by an investment letter,
1. 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958).
2. Mergers, consolidations and sales of assets are also exempt under SEC Rule 133,
17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1962).
3. The introduction to § 4 provides that § 5 "shall not apply to any of the
following transactions."
4. Distribution has been defined as "the entire process by which in the course of
a public offering a block of securities is dispersed and ultimately comes to rest in the
hands of the investing public." Oklahoma Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), aff'd,
100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939).
5. Each factual situation must be inquired into to determine the availability of the
exemption. It has been held that the number of offerees is not the most important factor,
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); and that the principal factor is the
number of offerees, Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (V.D. Pa. 1951). A
statement fairly summarizing the modern approach was made in Central Bank & Trust
Co. v. Robinson, 137 Colo. 409, 417, 326 P.2d 82, 87 (1958), in which the court said:
"An offer can be made to a large class and not be public, and conversely, to a small class
and be public. The real test is-whether the particular class of persons affected need the
information available by registration."
6. See Loss, SECURITIES RECULATION (Supp. 1955, at 410). If an individual
purchaser, not a dealer in securities, purchases with a view to distribution, he is a statutory
underwriter, and the exemption is lost.
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though this is not always true; nor if it is given is it conclusive evidence of
7
investment intent.
Generally speaking, the section 4(1) exemption extends to private
offerings, as opposed to "public offerings."" There is presently no clear
definition of what constitutes a private offering, and it is doubtful if a
definite meaning can ever attach in view of the Commission's reluctance
to set precise standards in this area. Guideposts, established in some
instances by the errors of others, are available, however.
Shortly after the act became law, the Commission, through its General
Counsel, set out certain factors to be used as criteria in determining whether
an offering came within the sphere of an exempt transaction. They are:
(1) the number of the offerees and their relationship to each other and
to the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering;
and (4) the manner of the offering. 10 It must be emphasized that no
combination of these elements will automatically result in an exempt transaction. Courts have on occasion discounted the importance of one or more
of these factors if the overall intent of taking for investment was lacking. 1
Should it be determined that the stock was taken with a view to distribution, and a resale was effected, the party making this sale might be viewed
2
as a statutory underwriter under section 2(11) of the Securities Act.1
Being an underwriter, the exemption of section 4(1) which specifically
excludes underwriters 13 is destroyed, and the party will be in violation of
section 5 of the act, which prohibits non-exempt transactions and sales of
non-exempt securities "unless a registration statement is in effect as to
[these securities] ...."14 It should also be noted that if one party violates
the investment intent requirement, the exemption is lost for the entire
group. As stated by Professor Israels:
[T]he law is clear that responsibility can be imposed, in effect,
retroactively, if it should be determined that a single purchaser's
resale was motivated by circumstances reasonably contemplated
7. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12,

1957): "A representation by a purchaser that he is taking for 'investment' when in fact
he concurrently is dividing a participation among others or reselling a portion of a commitment to others is worthless."
8. See Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l)
(1958) . See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Campbell
v. Degenther, 97
F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Robinson, 137 Colo. 409,
326 P.2d 82 (1958).
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935.
11. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12,
1957)i2. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1958).
13. 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958).
14. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
The terms of this section make itunlawful to use the mails or other interstate means of
communication to sell securities when a registration statement isnot ineffect.
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when the original purchase was made, and that therefore his representation of "investment" intent was an unacceptable basis for
the exemption.1"
15a
Due to the civil and criminal liabilities which may be incurred,
it is imperative that every precaution be taken to ascertain true investment
intent and to preserve the exemption. One of the most common methods
employed to this end is the use of the investment letter.

Not all holders of securities obtained under an exemption have signed
investment letters. This is particularly true with reference to controlling
shareholders. However, most companies for their own protection as well
as for that of the group in general, insist that parties to whom investment
stock is issued sign an investment letter. Basically, it is not the letter itself
that is of importance, but rather the expression of intent to purchase for
investment which is manifested by the letter.' 6 An integral part of the
concept of purchasing for investment is the holding for a substantial length
of time prior to resale. A period of time such as six months or one year is
not enough to satisfy the requirements of intent, whether an investment
17
letter is given or not.
THE INVESTMENT LETTER

In general the letter represents that the purchaser is buying for investment and not with a view to distribution. 18 In form, the letter sets
forth that:
[T]he purchaser knows that the issuer is selling the securities
without registration in reliance upon the representations contained
in the letter, . . . also that he realized that intent to resell upon the
occurrence or non-occurrence of a reasonably foreseeable event
is not enough upon which to ground the availability of the
exemption. 19
Obviously, the mere taking of an investment letter without providing
the necessary machinery for enforcement of it may prove as valueless as
taking none at all. Additional protection may be afforded the company
15. Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45
855 (1959).

VA.

L.

REV. 851,

15a. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1958); Securities Act of 1933, § 20, 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
77t (1958).
16. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug.
12, 1957).
17. Israels, supra note 15, at 853: "The concept of 'purchase for investment' never
included any holding period analagous to the six months required under the Internal Revenue Code to establish long-term capital gains."
18. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1l) (1958).
19. lsraels, supra note 15, at 861.
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by the placing of a restriction on the transfer of the shares. Notice of
this restriction, or reference to it, should be placed on the face of the
certificate and a stop order given to the transfer agent. The power of a
company to require this is well settled, because "the signer of an investment
letter consents, at least by implication, to a restriction upon the transfer
o This implied consent permits the issuer to set a
of his holdings ....
restriction on the face of the stock supported by a "stop transfer" "the effect
of which is to sound the alarm when the securities are presented for change
21
of registration."
Circumstances may arise, such as a resale to another investment purchaser, which require lifting the stop transfer. To effectuate this, a letter
from the issuer to the transfer agent is required. The issuer in turn must
be satisfied that he may safely permit this transfer without violating the
securities laws. The usual method of allaying the issuer's anxieties in this
regard is for the purchaser to obtain a no-action letter from the Securities
Commission. A resolution is then passed by the issuer's board of directors
permitting the transfer of the particular securities involved pursuant to
the letter. Notice of this resolution is sent to the transfer agent, who can
then transfer the shares safely. If the issuer, after receipt of a no-action
letter, refuses to order that the stop transfer be lifted, the party may resort
to court action. In SEC v. Guild Films Co.,2 2 a bank pledgee brought an
action against the issuing company to compel transfer of the stock. The
court ordered the transfer, "based . . . on the referee's report which found
that the stock was exempt from the Securities Act of 1933."23
Once true investment intent has been ascertained by means of the
investment letter and its associated devices, the question arises as to when
an investment purchaser or controlling person, who actually took with
investment intent, may resell his holdings. It is necessary to discuss these
two groups separately since differing rules have been applied to each.
DIsPosrrION BY AN INVESTMENT PURCHASER

There are few circumstances, absent registration, when an investment
purchaser may undertake a public distribution of his holdings. One of
these occurs when he has held his stock for a sufficient length of time.
A. Length of Time Held
Although some cases have held that specific periods of time were
inadequate, neither the courts nor the Commission has set a precise germi20. Id. at 862.
21. Ibid.

22. 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960).
23. Id. at 489.
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nation period, after which time exempt securities may be distributed safely
to the public. In Gilligan, Will 6 Co. v. SEC,2 4 a resale within approximately ten months was held to be indicative of no investment intent. The
Crowell-Collier release stated that "holding for the six months' capital gain
period of the tax statutes . . . does not afford a statutory basis for an

exemption . *."..25
On the other hand, it appears that holding investment
securities for a period of two years may be enough to satisfy the investment
intent requirement. In United States v. Sherwood'2 the Commission
sought to have the defendant Sherwood declared a statutory underwriter.
Sherwood had obtained his shares in September 1955, as an investment
purchaser. In September 1957, he began distribution of these shares to
the public without filing a registration statement. The court held that
"the passage of two years before the commencement of distribution of any
of these shares is an insuperable obstacle to my finding that Sherwood
took these shares with a view to distribution thereof ....,,7
Any distribution without registration prior to the lapse of a two year
period probably would be looked on unfavorably by the Commission. Justification for this position becomes readily apparent if one considers the ease
with which the registration requirements could be circumvented should the
Commission adopt a substantially shorter holding period. Additional factors,
such as the amount of stock which is intended to be distributed, the amount
of public information available and disseminated regarding the issuer, and
the amount of the issuer's stock outstanding together with the active trading
in that stock, may have some influence with the Commission as to when
an unregistered distribution may be made.
When a resale of this nature is contemplated, it is always advisable
to seek a no-action letter from the Commission, regardless of the length
of time held or other circumstances. This course of action will not only
ease the mind of the prospective seller, but will also afford protection to
other members of the group holding under the same exemption. 28
B. Change in Circumstances
A change in circumstances may provide an alternative for an investment
purchaser who wishes to sell to the public prior to the expiration of a
two year period. 29 This change may be in the circumstances of the purchaser, such as "severe business reverses necessitating the liquidation of all

24. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
25. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug.
12, 1957).

26. 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
27. Id. at 483.
28. Israels, supra note 15, at 861.
29. Id. at 855.
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outside investments,"8 or in the circumstances of the issuer, such as when
"a drug company . . . goes into the machinery business on a large scale."'3
The latter situation has been referred to as a "crystal clear" case. 2 A
question may arise as to the importance of the length of time the securities are
held, prior to the attempted distribution based on a change of circumstances.
A hypothetical example would be a real estate company engaged solely in
the acquisition and development of real estate and mining properties when
the investment purchasers acquired their stock, which subsequently, without
the consent of the investment purchasers, embarked upon a program of
divesting itself altogether of its mining and real estate properties and enters
the utilities business on a major scale. Assume that the investment shareholders had never been officers or directors of the company, had only
recently acquired their stock, and had held it for substantially less than
two years. A clear case of change in circumstances would appear to be
demonstrated, and it is highly doubtful if a short holding period would
prove to be an obstacle to a public distribution of the shares.
It is clear, however, that mere failure of the issuer to live up to the
purchaser's expectations is an inadequate foundation upon which to base
the exemption. The argument has been broached that the resale was
undertaken "only after a change of the issuer's circumstances as a result
of which petitioners, acting as prudent investors, thought it wise to sell."88
The change alluded to was the failure of the issuer, a publisher, "to increase
its advertising space" 4 as anticipated by the shareholder. The court agreed
with the Commission that when the purchaser intended to hold the securities only if the company continued to operate profitably, he did not purchase
with investment intent.
It appears that in a proper case, an unforseen change of circumstances
may prove a worthwhile field of exploration for a distribution-minded
investment purchaser.
C. Registration
The requisite preliminary to a public offering of non-exempt securities is registration. In view of the Commission's readiness to recommend
prosecution even when an investment purchaser who has held for a long time
'undertakes a public distribution,88 the inference seems justified that the
Commission would also prefer all public offerings of exempt securities to be
registered. Unfortunately, in many cases this may produce severe hardship.
There is very-little that a shareholder can do to persuade an unwilling issuer
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1959).
Ibid.
United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

1961]

COMMENTS

to register his shares. Problems of expense arise, as well as management's
desire to maintain the price of the shares, which may be adversely affected
by a large secondary distribution. An advisable procedure is for the purchaser, at the time of purchase, to secure an agreement from the issuer
under which the shares will be registered at a later date, possibly upon the
demand of the holders of a specified number of shares. Failure by an
investment purchaser to obtain this agreement may result in his being
compelled to hold his shares for a long time, regardless of the company's
activities, general market conditions, or his own financial requirements.
The situation would be eased somewhat if exempt securities were considered to be good collateral, but financial institutions and individuals are
loath to lend money against collateral which, in event of default, cannot
be sold for the protection of the lender. In a recent decision 6 a bank took
the borrower's exempt securities as loan collateral. Seven months later,
upon the debtor's failure to repay the bank, it proceeded to dispose of the
securities to the public. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's
ruling that these sales were not exempt, and that the bank was a statutory
underwriter, selling unregistered stock. Neither the "good faith" of the
bank in accepting these securities for collateral, nor the fact that the bank
did not purchase from the issuer, influenced the court.
D. Sale to Another Investment Purchaser
There appears to be no restriction on the resale of exempt securities to
another investment purchaser. Of course, the same requirement of investment intent as evidenced by an investment letter applies to this transaction
as it did from the issuer to the initial purchaser. In view of this fact, resales
of this type are usually below the trading market price of the stock, since
the new purchaser will be faced with the same problems of disposition as his
predecessor. Even in this situation, a no-action letter must be obtained from
the Commission to reassure the issuer's counsel and to give him grounds
upon which to authorize the transfer of the shares.
DISPOSITION BY CONTROLLING PERSONS
Perhaps the most important method of disposition referred to thus far
is the potential public distribution after a two year holding period. This
avenue is not open for a controlling person. However, it has been suggested
that section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 19333 7 provides a limited method
of distribution for controlling shareholders not available to investment
purchasers. Prior to a consideration of this section, a comment on the
concept of "control" is in order.
36. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1959).
37. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1958).
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As indicated by the House Report, for purposes of the Securities Act:
The concept of control herein involved is not a narrow one depending upon a mathematical formula of 51 percent of voting power,
but is broadly defined to permit the provisions of the Act
to become
38
effective wherever the fact of control actually exists.
The point will resolve itself into the question of whether a party is
in a position, by virtue of stock ownership, to exercise controlling influence
over the management or policies of a company. As suggested by the House
Report, this influence may be exercised by parties who own substantially
less than fifty-one per cent of the voting stock. The courts have complied
basically with the congressional intent in their interpretation of situations
of control, although "there has been very little litigation with respect to
control . .
9
A.

Controlling Persons and Section 4(2)

In the Matter of Ira Haupt 6 Co.40 was an action instituted against
an underwriter for the public sale of stock held by a controlling person
and not covered by a registration statement. One of the defenses raised
was that the provisions of section 4(2) ("brokers' transactions, executed
upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the open or counter market,
but not the solicitation of such orders"), 4 1 were intended to cover this transaction and free it from the registration requirement. The Commission,
however, held that read together with section 4(1 )42 "public distributions by
controlling persons, through underwriters, are intended generally to be
subject to the registration and prospectus requirements of the Act."'1 43 The
true purpose of section 4(2) was to assure "an open market for securities
at all times, even though a stop order against further distribution of such
securities may have been entered."4 4 Finally, the Commission concluded
that "Section 4(2) cannot exempt transaction's by an underwriter executed
over the Exchange in connection with a distribution for a controlling
45
stockholder."
In this state of affairs, brokers were understandably hesitant to execute
sale orders of even small blocks of stock for a party who might be determined
to be a member of the controlling group. An attempt at clarification was
made by the Commission and embodied in rule 154,46 pertinent parts of
which follow.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933).
39. Loss, SECURITIEs RECULATION 461 (1951).
40. 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946).
41. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1958).

38. H. R.

42.
43.
44.
45.

68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958).
In the Matter of Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 601 (1946).
Id. at 603. (Italicized in original.)
Id. at 604.

46. SEC Rule 154(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(a) (Supp. 1962).
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The term "brokers' transactions" in section 4(2) of the Act shall
be deemed to include transactions by a broker acting as agent for
the account of any person controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, the issuer of the securities which are the
subject of the transactions .... For the purpose of paragraph (a)
of this section, the term "distribution" shall not apply to transactions involving an amount not substantial in relation to the
numbers of shares or units of the security outstanding and the
aggregate volume of trading in such security. Without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, the term "distribution" shall not
be deemed to include a sale or series of sales of securities which,
together with all other sales of securities of the same class by or on
behalf of the same person within the preceding period of six
months, will not exceed the following: (1) if the security is traded
only otherwise than on a securities exchange, approximately 1 per
cent of the shares or units of such security outstanding ....
Further provision is then made for shares of stock traded on a securities
exchange. The rule seemed to settle clearly an Ira Haupt type of situation,
establishing the upper limits of sale by a controlling person at one per
cent each six month period for holders of unlisted stock, and prescribing
a formula for listed stock. The broker's fear of participating in an illegal
distribution of unregistered shares was apparently allayed. Rule 154 became
thought of as a vehicle whereby controlling persons who held exempt securities could dispose of their holdings up to one per cent of all outstanding
shares each six months, regardless of the time for which they had been
held. It was and is used today as a unique method of disposition, available
only to controlling persons, for the purpose of distributing securities obtained
under an exemption, as long as the transaction does not involve an amount
"substantial in relation to the number of shares or units of the security
outstanding . . . . 47 This interpretation of rule 154 appears to be shared
by noted authorities in the securities field. With reference to "secondary
distribution" by "an affiliate of an issuer,"48 Professor Loss says: "[Tihe
Commission came up with a new formula which still does not go back to the
pre-Haupt test but does prescribe a rule-of-thumb definition of the troublesome word 'distribution.' 49
After quoting pertinent sections from rule 154, he goes on to state that:
[T]he rule provides that there shall not be deemed to be a "distribution" so long as the transaction in question and all other sales of
the same class of securities by or on behalf of the same person
within the preceding six months do not exceed approximately one
47. SEC Rule 154(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(b) (Supp. 1962).
48. SEC Rule 154(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(a) (Supp. 1962). For purposes of
the Securities Act an "affiliate of an issuer" would be any "person controlling, controlled
by, or under common control with" the issuer.
49. Loss, op. cit. supra note 6, at 410.
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per cent of the shares or units of an over-the-counter security and,
in the case of a security traded on an exchange, the lesser of that
amount or the aggregate reported volume of exchange trading
during any week within the preceding four weeks.50
Presuming that the broker met the other stipulations of the rule, it
would appear that any controlling person, holding under the exemption
of section 4(1), or any other exemption to which the rules apply, could
dispose of one per cent of his holdings each six months irrespective of how
long he had held the securities.
Additional weight is added to this position by another prominent writer
who suggests that the purpose of section 4(2) "is to exempt casual sales,
even by controlling persons for whose 'distributions' [public offerings]
through an underwriter registration would be required." 5' 1 In line with
this analysis, and his feeling that this registration-free resale provision in
favor of controlling persons is a desirable provision, he suggests that:
"logically there is good basis for similar administrative treatment of sales
'52
by an 'investment purchaser' and perhaps even of sales by the issuer itself.
Finally, he concludes that a beneficial change could be made in the form
of an "amendment of rule 154 to make it applicable to transactions on
behalf of an investment purchaser, or by the issuer."'53 Neither of these
writers suggests any limitation on the use of the rule by virtue of the length
of time held, the information available to the public concerning the issuer
and its operations, or the number of shares attempted to be sold publicly,
so long as they meet the technical one per cent requirement. 54
However, in conversations with Professor Sowards, 55 it was stated that
this interpretation and use of rule 154 is far broader than the construction
placed on the rule by the Securities Commission. Professor Sowards has
stated that in recent talks with a representative of the Securities and
Exchange Commission,56 he was informed that in the view of the Commission, the availability of the one per cent rule is limited to those controlling
persons who are not attempting to dispose of their holdings piecemeal. In
short, use of the rule once or even twice is acceptable, but repeated sales
which reflect a pattern of disposal would in all probability be labeled a
"distribution" and thus would be violative of the act.
50. Ibid.
51. Israels, supra note 15, at 865.
52. Ibid.

53. Id. at 868 n.78.

54. Presumably, the affiliate of an issuer which has recently issued two million shares
could himself sell to the public, through a broker, without registration, twenty thousand
shares during the ensuing six months period, and twenty thousand shares each six month

period thereafter.

55. Mr. Hugh L. Sowards, Professor of Law, University of Miami, Coral Gables,

Fla. (1961).
56. Mr. Manuel Cohen, Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission.
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In view of the overall language of the rule, it is highly questionable
that a controlling person who met all the other prerequisites would, under
all circumstances, be permitted to sell up to the one per cent limit. "[A]n
amount not substantial in relation to the number of shares or units of the
security outstanding" 57 could be interpreted as a further limitation. One
per cent of the outstanding shares might be construed as a substantialamount
of shares. In addition, the rule explicitly states that the one per cent
formula was not intended to limit the generality of the "not substantial"
portion.
Such factors as the number of shareholders, distribution of the
stock, and general public knowledge of the company and its operations
may affect potential use of the rule.
Exemptions have been developed to meet specific needs, or to permit
sales of securities to parties who by experience or position may be considered
sophisticated investors and do not require the protection of registration
with its full disclosure provisions. When attempts are made to sell securities to the public without proper registration, severe handicaps are placed
in the path. This is exemplified by the provision of rule 154 that the
exemption is lost if the broker or his principal "solicits or arranges for the
solicitation of orders to buy in anticipation of or in connection with such
transactions . . . ."59 If this means that the rule is not available when the
broker has solicited offers from purchasers to buy the securities, its availability for transactions in the over-the-counter market may be doubtful, by
virtue of the mechanics of that market.
This would restrict the practical usefulness of section 4(2) as interpreted by rule 154 to securities traded on an exchange and to a select few
controlling persons selling through a broker. Against this stands the fact
that provision is made in the rule for trading "otherwise than on a securities
exchange," 60 which at least raises an inference that these transactions may
occur off an exchange. It should be borne in mind that sales by controlling
persons to the public, unless through a broker, are never exempt under
section 4(2) since it applies only to brokers' transactions.6 1
CONCLUSION

The avenues of disposition of exempt securities, outside of registration,
are narrow indeed for the investment purchaser, and even more restricted
for the controlling person. It appears fairly certain that investment intent
is demonstrated by holding stock for two years, and that an investment
57. SEC Rule 154(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(b) (Supp. 1962).
58. Ibid.
59. SEC Rule 154(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(a)(3) (Supp. 1962).
60. SEC Rule 154(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(b)(1) (Supp. 1962).
61. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1958).
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purchaser may engage safely in a public distribution after that time. The
same is not true for a controlling person. Nor, as is commonly thought,
may parties in control make free and uninhibited use of the so called
tone per cent rule." Perhaps justification for the Commission's view may
be found in the fact that a person in control is in a position, by virtue
of his influence on company affairs, to cause the company to register his
shares at will. On the other hand, it may be argued that the import of the
words of rule 154 seems to warrant resale by any person in a control position
within the specifications as set out and without regard to the length of
time for which the securities have been held. Whatever arguments may
exist for a contrary interpretation, it would be foolhardy, in view of the
Commission's stand in this area, for a controlling person to incur the risk
of civil and criminal liabilities which could follow in the path of a nonexempt distribution. When a distribution to the public is contemplated
by a controlling person, the better course is registration.
LEON
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